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CHAPTER 4
Security Dynamics: Multilayered 
Security Governance in an Age 
of Complexity, Uncertainty, 
and Resilience
TAPIO JUNTUNEN & SIRPA VIRTA 
Takeaways for Leading Change
Claims of increasing complexity and nonlinear change in contemporary 
societies and global politics are often presented as a justification for 
increasing demands of resilience as a key strategic response in security policy 
and practices. Our conceptual analysis juxtaposes resilience as a security 
mentality with other – partly overlapping – security mentalities such as 
defence, protection, and prevention. This provides a good case study of how 
perceived complexity of our societies affects the way in which governance 
and leadership are understood. The theory of nodal security governance 
resonates with the idea of relational leadership. Our analysis suggests the rise 
of resilience as a mentality might also indicate a certain lack or even crisis of 
leadership. The chapter invites readers to exercise a normative and ethical 
reflection on the practical effects of different security mentalities from the 
level of individuals to the level of global governance. It also gives readers a 
basic account of what security is, what it means to govern through security, 
and what the purpose of security is in relation to sovereignty, political order, 
and the freedoms and responsibilities of citizens.
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How should security be governed? What are the requirements for security leadership today? These questions are being voiced with 
increasing urgency as a variety of new threats to security emerge and are 
recognised. There is a growing awareness that the promotion of security as 
both an objective and subjective condition will require new ways of thinking 
and acting (Wood & Shearing, 2007). In the past decade, security studies 
in many disciplines, notably in international relations, political science, 
governance studies, and criminology, have addressed this challenge.
The governance of security is based on policies 
and strategies which involve responding to 
threats or breaches of security that have already 
occurred. It also involves anticipating and seeking 
to prevent threats that might occur. The analysis 
of security governance explores ways of thinking 
(mentalities) underlying these strategies, the 
organisational forms used to implement those 
ways of thinking (institutions such as the police, 
military, and international organisations), the 
techniques used to turn mentalities into action 
(technologies, policies, and strategies), and the resulting actions (practices). 
In this chapter, we use the nodal theory of networked and multilayered 
security governance (Johnston & Shearing, 2003) as the framework through 
which we analyse responses to the changing security environment and 
increasing complexity of threats and risks. The perspective of multilayered 
security governance focuses on the dynamics, contemporary policies, 
and practices of security. It also provides perspectives on the societal 
implications of different ways of understanding security governance. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse resilience politics as an 
example of a novel security mentality by comparing it with some of the 
more traditional security mentalities such as defence, protection and 
prevention. We argue the strong impact of resilience politics as a novel 
security mentality in recent years is evident in the various efforts to 
rearrange institutions, technologies, and practices of security governance. 
As to the question of social complexity, we argue the growing influence 
of resilience approaches in relation to security policy and governance 
The purpose of this 
chapter is to analyse 
resilience politics as 
an example of a novel 
security mentality.
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offers an illustrative example of how responses to the interconnectedness 
of modern societies and perceptions of increasing uncertainty also have 
effects on how the changing demands of leadership are understood. 
Using the nodal theory of security governance, this chapter also asks 
what implications – institutional, practical, and technological – resilience 
strategies and the supposedly increasing vulnerability of our societies 
pose to security leadership.
The chapter is structured as follows: we begin by elaborating on what 
security is and its relationship to key concepts such as sovereignty, order, 
freedom, and political legitimacy. From there we analyse how the emergence 
of resilience politics as a novel security mentality has transformed the 
agenda of security governance, including dominant threat perceptions 
and agency in providing security. We also illustrate how the emergence 
of resilience politics has affected the way security and the technologies of 
its governance have been transformed in the last decade in the context of 
the Nordic model of internal security and critical infrastructure politics as 
well as in the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS). We then present 
a concluding discussion.
What is Security?
In political science, security is defined as the core function of the state. 
The most familiar definition can be found in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan; 
Hobbes (1651/1999, p. 123) argued that without the state, society would 
descend into a war of all against all (i.e. a state of nature). It was in order 
to avoid this that men came together to make a social contract, building a 
state to provide security. Therefore, the state has been given the power over 
people and territory. This exceptional power derives from the definition 
of the state: “A state is a human community that (successfully) claims 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” 
(Weber, 1946/1991, p. 78. Emphasis in original). To sustain their external 
security, states have military forces and intelligence authorities. To sustain 
internal security (political, social, and public order), states have police 
forces and criminal justice systems.
70
Leading Change in a Complex World: Transdisciplinary Perspectives
Security Dynamics: Multilayered Security Governance in an Age of Complexity, Uncertainty, and Resilience
Security is commonly defined as a state of being. This is illustrated in 
the following definition, published in the SAGE Dictionary of Criminology, 
which is free of discipline-based connotations:
Security is the state of being secure, specifically freedom from fear, danger, risk, 
care, poverty or anxiety� Security also implies certainty� The roots of the term 
are in the Latin securitas/secures, derived from se (meaning without) cura (fear, 
anxiety, pains, worry)� Safety is closely related to security� Safety also means 
freedom from danger or risk� However, it has additional connotations which 
have more to do with physical conditions, e�g� freedom from injury, the safety of 
the body and of property� In this context certainty refers to certainty of order, 
assurance and predictability (Virta, 2006, p� 371; Virta, 2013b, p� 312)�
When defined as the core function of the state and, according to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), as a core human right, 
security is a powerful political concept and phenomenon. In this reading, 
the sovereign (state) has the power or position to define the governance, 
political use, content, objectives, distribution, etc. of security. Fundamental 
questions of democracy are ambiguous in this context. Governance of 
security – as a concept – refers to organisations, strategies, and practices. 
Governance through security is always a political act. There is an irrevocable 
link between security and the maintenance of sovereignty. The question of 
who has the power or legitimacy to make claims on matters of (national) 
security is fundamentally a political one. When a specific phenomenon is 
authoritatively labelled a security issue – that is, a threat to the existing 
social order – it is more easily perceived as an issue to be dealt with using 
exceptional measures. The normal running of politics and governance 
does not typically rely on such exceptional measures (Huysmans, 2004). 
What we have presented here is a constructivist perspective of security, 
which starts from the premise that threats perceived by the state elite 
or the society in general are not just “out there” in the objective reality 
to be “picked up”. Instead, political leadership and other authorities are 
involved in processes of signification that construct and give meaning to 
these threats. This also affects perceptions of what security is and what it 
means for the polity in the first place (see also Vuori, 2017).
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The vast political capital vested in the term “security” means that any 
policy pursued in its name is difficult to argue with: How could anyone 
reasonably be opposed to security (Zedner, 2009, p. 144)? Although 
contemporary security leadership necessitates an understanding of the 
complexity of different societal threats and risks, one should not forget 
that claims for security are essentially contested. In other words, although 
security is a rather common concept, its use is not clearly definable. It can 
refer to various objects, processes, and societal contexts depending on 
one’s perspective and values (Buzan, 1983, p. 6; see also Gallie, 1956, p. 168).
Security can be seen as a fundamentally “wicked problem”, as a 
“particularly complex and tricky leadership and management context” 
(see the introductory chapter of this book). This also means that security 
cannot be “solved” for good, either in existential terms – meaning that 
there is no absolute state of security available in human life – or in the 
sense that different stakeholders would achieve a consensus over the value, 
meaning, and practical efficacy of different security mentalities.
Governing Security Through Resilience
In recent years, scholars in various academic fields have noted that resilience 
politics is challenging traditional ways of thinking about the governance 
of security, such as the mentalities of defence, protection, and prevention 
(Chandler, 2017; Corry, 2014; Virta, 2013a). We argue a security mentality based 
on resilience is emerging and transforming the ways in which governance 
and governability are perceived. Instead of focusing on the governance 
and prevention of foreseeable uncertainties and threats, resilience politics 
is presented as an answer to the assumed inability of our societies and 
governments to guarantee security with preventive and proactive policies. 
This is thought to happen because of the increasingly complex and 
interconnected nature of our societies and new threats emanating from both 
man-made and natural sources (Rosa, Renn, & McCright, 2014). 
As a concept, resilience has a distinctive academic background in life 
sciences such as systems ecology as well as psychology and complexity 
thinking dating back to the 1950s (see Bourbeau, 2018). From these 
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academic fields, resilience thinking has, over the last two decades, slowly 
transformed into a concept with policy relevance for many societies and 
international organisations. In contemporary security politics, resilience 
is used as a strategic principle or objective of various policy fields and 
issues such as planet politics and climate change, governance of increasing 
urbanisation, counterterrorism, criminology, and social work. 
Resilience politics also has its critics. Scholars have paid attention to 
the “dark side of resilience” (Schmidt, 2015); this refers to the tendency 
to prioritise reactive preparedness instead of increasing security through 
prevention, anticipation, and foresight. They have warned about the 
unintended negative consequences of the increasing responsibilisation 
of vulnerable communities and local actors as the subjects of their own 
fate and security. Resilience politics has also been associated with the 
process of neoliberalisation and austerity politics; trends that can also be 
challenges to security governance and leadership models (Joseph, 2013). 
Finally, critics of resilience politics have also noted some resilience 
approaches seem to treat crises almost as desirable experiences local 
groups can use as valuable lessons to (re)build cohesion and the adaptive 
capacities of their communities (Tierney, 2015). These observations on the 
dark side of resilience offer students of leadership and management a good 
example of how current trends in strategic thinking can also be approached 
with critical and ethical deliberation.
Contesting Traditional Security Mentalities
Resilience is usually defined as the latent ability of systems, individuals, 
communities, and organisations to (i) withstand the effects of major 
disruptions, (ii) maintain one’s ability to act amid a crisis, and (iii) bounce 
back from a crisis and use the experience to increase one’s adaptability in 
the future (see Brand & Jax, 2007). As a novel security mentality – as a 
set of ideas that makes claims about how security is valued and achieved 
(Wood & Shearing, 2007, p. 7)—resilience challenges some of the traditional 
state-centric security mentalities such as those of defence, protection, and 
prevention. In the security mentality based on the primacy of defence, the 
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focus of governance is on safeguarding the territorial integrity and continuity 
of key societal functions of the nation state (external security). In the case 
of protection and prevention, the focus of governance is either on social, 
economic, and political substructures. These correlate with the level of 
human development or on providing internal security and order through 
punitive actions, policing and other deterring technologies and practices.
When examined through the logic of defence, the main security threats 
are usually perceived to be posed by other state actors or other relatively 
organised collective entities or polities. In the logic of protection, the 
main threats are perceived to stem from structural distortions such as 
poverty, inequality, and other cultural practices that cause structural 
violence. Finally, in the logic of prevention, security policy focuses more 
on the general welfare of society and its orderliness. Predominant threats 
are usually perceived to stem from organised illegal activities or specific 
societal distortions that endanger domestic order and the sense of security, 
such as the process of political radicalisation. 
The security mentality based on resilience, by contrast, emphasises 
the radical openness and uncertain nature of the threat environment in 
an age of increasing complexity (Juntunen & Hyvönen, 2014). Thus, the 
primary objective of resilience politics is not to enhance the robustness of 
critical infrastructures (e.g. energy networks), nor does resilience politics 
rely purely on physical technologies of coercion (e.g. military or police 
forces). Instead, it emphasises the need to increase the mental and physical 
adaptability of individuals, communities, the private sector, and civil 
society to face unpredictable, even inevitable threats. Resilience politics 
aims to enhance the functionality of society. That is, to maintain the core 
purposes of societies during crises due to the tight coupling of societal 
functions with the increasing complexity and vulnerability of modern 
physical infrastructure (Pursiainen, 2018, p. 633). 
The main differences between the logics of defence, protection, 
prevention, and resilience in light of security governance are illustrated 
in Table 1. These logics are further elaborated through five dimensions: 
who or what the referent object of security governance is, what kinds 
of threat perceptions the logic relies on, who the primary security 
actors (providers of security) are, how the agenda of security policy is 
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formulated, and how the role of security policy is understood in relation 
to the normal running of politics.
REFERENT 
OBJECT OF 
SECURITY 
GOVERNANCE
DOMINANT 
THREAT 
PERCEPTIONS
KEY SECURITY 
AGENTS
SECURITY 
POLICY AGENDA 
(STATED OR 
IMPLICIT)
RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN 
POLITICS AND 
SECURITY
D
EF
EN
CE
Territorial integrity 
of the state and 
borders; critical 
infrastructure and 
continuity of state 
functions
Fear and uncertainty 
caused by other 
states or otherwise 
highly organised 
political actors; 
conflicts between 
state actors
Defence forces and 
other key actors 
protecting territorial 
integrity and the 
continuity of key 
state functions and 
internal order
The intentions of 
(rational state) actors 
can be influenced 
through the 
practices of external 
deterrence, alliance 
politics, power 
projection, costly 
signalling, etc�
Security issues tend 
to be separated 
from other societal 
processes and 
normal political 
order; security as the 
realm of exceptional; 
enemy images might 
prevail
PR
O
TE
CT
IO
N
Vulnerable individuals, 
groups, and 
communities
Political, economic, 
and social structures 
that cause inequality 
and suffering; global 
warming, resource 
scarcity, and 
deprivation; intrastate 
ethnic conflicts
Local governments 
(responsibility 
to protect); 
international and 
nongovernmental 
actors providing 
humanitarian 
assistance and 
interventions
Explicit ambition to 
remove the structural 
sources of insecurity 
and free the suffering 
from harm
Security issues are 
comprehensively 
“nested” in the 
socioeconomic 
structures of the 
society and culture; 
state-driven security 
concerns are often 
politicised
PR
EV
EN
TI
O
N
Political, social, and 
public order and the 
welfare of society 
Organised crime and 
violent extremism; 
illegal immigration 
and human 
trafficking; terrorism 
and radicalisation; 
crime, violence, and 
disturbances of public 
order in general
Law enforcement 
actors such as 
police, emergency 
service, and other 
state actors; also, 
increasingly, social 
security actors, 
private companies, 
and communities
Inclusive 
“pacification” of the 
society through a 
mixture of welfare 
policies and crime 
prevention, including 
counterterrorism, 
visible policing, and 
law enforcement
Political legitimacy 
and authority of the 
security providers is 
central, but otherwise, 
the relationship 
between security and 
politics is ambiguous 
and contested 
RE
SI
LI
EN
CE
Processes 
maintaining the 
cohesion and 
everyday functioning 
of society
Unpredictable 
nonlinear 
threats such as 
environmental 
hazards and other 
various “wicked 
problems”; blurring of 
external and internal 
spheres of security
Civil society, local 
communities, private 
sector, and eventually 
also individual 
citizens; government 
governing “from a 
distance”
To strengthen 
individuals’ and 
societies’ autonomic 
capacities for 
adaptation, recovery, 
and reform
Unclear: reduces 
the need to rely 
on articulated 
threats and enemy 
images typical of 
the logic of defence, 
but increases 
securitisation of the 
societal fabric
TABLE 1: Four logics or mentalities of security policy (see Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2016; Virta, 2013a)
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The assumed technological and societal complexity of the so-called 
“risk society” indicates challenging times for traditional top-down models 
of security governance, leadership, and management, both within and 
between sovereign entities. Evans and Reid (2014) even suggest security 
governance based on resilience is an invitation to learn to live life more 
dangerously – not safely. The responsibility to provide or increase resilience 
seems to diffuse to an increasing number of actors or nodes. The role of civil 
society, private actors, and grassroots movements is on the rise. That said, 
some scholars claim this has led to the responsibilisation of individuals and 
communities without a true transition of power or resources to participate 
in the strategic processes that define the concrete practices and goals of 
security governance (Gladfelter, 2018; Stark & Taylor, 2014; Tierney, 2015). 
Others emphasise that governance approaches based on resilience have 
the potential to reverse the old top-down leadership processes and give 
citizens and communities more agency over their own political and social 
conditions. Howell (2015, p. 69) aptly sums up this idea:
As a technique of governance, resilience works primarily through an attempt to 
enhance its targets: a more ambitious aim than responsibilisation� This, I suspect, 
is true wherever resilience involves a concept of not just “bouncing back” (from 
disasters, attacks, crises, etc�), but of “bouncing forward”�
This type of understanding conceives of resilience as a strategy to 
increase the capability of individuals and communities to act in an 
increasingly autonomous and independent manner without the need to 
rely excessively on state authorities. This resonates with the idea that 
security is actualised in various societal nodes, including “organic” nodes 
of leadership at the grassroots level. This line of thinking acknowledges 
that the traditional leadership and governance models based on a linear 
understanding of how events unfold are not sufficient by themselves. The 
understanding of leadership as a relational concept is also important in 
light of the actualisation of different resilience strategies.
To sum up, there seems to be rather wide agreement among security 
scholars that there is no single definition or target of application for 
resilience politics. They tend to speak about resilience in the plural to 
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avoid the risk of equating concrete governance practices and strategies 
performed under the label of resilience to a priori academic definitions of 
what resilience generally means as a security mentality (see Bourbeau & 
Ryan, 2017; Dunn Cavelty, Kaufman, & Kristensen, 2015). We suggest the 
abovementioned distinction of resilience from other security mentalities 
helps one grasp what resilience is by revealing what it is not, although 
we acknowledge the security mentalities we suggest above are also partly 
overlapping ideal types.
Different understandings of resilience as a security mentality have 
expanded the array of security agents and actors in recent years. This is a 
challenge to traditional understandings of sovereignty. There seems to be 
a shift in security governance towards relational leadership models, also 
discussed in this book. While in the traditional understanding, sovereignty 
is very much territorialised – even personalised – there is now an increasing 
focus on guidance, influencing, and other “responsibilising” techniques 
over traditional models of authority-based control. This provokes the 
question: Who are the ultimate agents responsible for providing security 
through resilience? The nodal theory of security provides one fruitful way 
to approach this.
From State to Nodal Security Governance
A growing school of thought in security studies and criminology centred on 
the concept of nodal governance also challenges traditional state-centred 
concepts of security governance (Johnston & Shearing, 2003). Security 
governance is also delivered in the corporate sector, nongovernment 
organisations, and transnational actors, among others. The recent shift 
from traditional state-centric security logics (such as territorial defence 
and maintenance of internal order through policing) towards conceptions 
emphasising societal resilience has given actorness to local communities, 
local activism and agile ad hoc coalitions of different organisations 
from different sectors of the society. As dominant threat perceptions 
increasingly highlight the significance of global interconnectedness and 
complex emergent processes, the responsibility for providing security 
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is scattered from and by the state authorities towards the subjects of 
insecurity (Methmann & Oels, 2015).
In the nodal governance of security, the state is recognised as only one 
node among a network of nodes participating in the delivery of security. 
There is an increasing focus on individual and community level adaptive 
capacities through different resilience strategies. However, this does not 
necessarily mean the power of the state or other traditional operators 
of security politics has diminished. Instead, the various new nodes of 
security governance are defined as locations of knowledge, capacity, and 
resources that can be deployed to both authorise and provide governance 
(Button, 2008, p. 15). In the EU, for example, the most significant nodes 
in internal and external security governance are the networks of member 
state representatives (e.g. security intelligence authorities and task forces 
of police commissioners) as well as the common European institutions 
(e.g. Europol and Eurojust in The Hague).
The Scandinavian or Nordic model of societal security, encompassing 
Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands, 
has been characterised by many as consensual, social democratic and 
welfare-oriented, nonpunitive (a low imprisonment rate), and inclusive 
(Virta, 2013a). The model covers criminal policy, penal policy, and crime 
prevention policies. The European model, on the other hand, has its roots 
in the establishment of the area of freedom, security, and justice in the 
European Council meeting in Tampere in 1999 (European Council, 1999). 
Multiannual EU programmes (after Tampere, The Hague Programme 
2004, and the Stockholm Programme 2009), together with other European 
internal security and policing strategies and common policies in home and 
justice affairs, have established a European internal security field.
This has led to a policy convergence in member states. The 
European Commission has been an important actor in promoting 
the harmonisation of crime prevention measures, law enforcement 
practices, and urban safety policies, as well as in creating a performance 
regime for monitoring the development in member states (Virta, 
2013a). The European model is focused more on internal security, on 
preventing global common threats (notably terrorism, organised crime, 
social exclusion, and illegal immigration) and on local-level practices. 
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Community policing and local-level cooperation is seen as a vital tool 
for preventing violent radicalisation. Common measures and practices 
have been adopted and implemented locally. What was earlier seen as 
a question of national security has now been localised and is also a part 
of the policy field of urban security.
There are also differences between the general EU and Nordic models. 
One example can be found from the approaches to critical infrastructure 
protection. In the Nordic countries, the role of what is today labelled 
the comprehensive societal resilience approach has traditionally been 
considered important, as has been the focus on the protection of physical 
infrastructure and increasing its redundancy. The EU, on the other hand, 
has traditionally focused on physical infrastructure and only recently 
started to map security technologies that would merge the protection-
centred approach with increasing demands for a more comprehensive 
societal resilience approach (Pursiainen, 2018, pp. 633–635).
One of the recent key documents based on the security mentality of 
resilience in the context of the EU’s external relations is the 2016 EUGS 
entitled “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe”. Although 
originally formulated in the context of the EU’s humanitarian and 
development policy programmes established in the Sahel and eastern 
regions of Africa in the early 2010s, in the EUGS, resilience appears as a 
strategic concept – that is, a security mentality. Resilience is mentioned 
some 40 times in the EUGS. Human security, the concept in vogue when 
the EU’s last foreign and security policy strategy was drafted in the 
early 2000s, is only mentioned four times – a clear verbal indication of a 
paradigm change from protection to resilience. In the EUGS, resilience is 
defined as the ability of states and societies to reform amid an increasingly 
complex and unpredictable threat environment (European External 
Action Service, 2016, p. 23).
Many scholars and key EU officials have noted the central role of 
resilience in the EUGS is also communicative (Mälksoo, 2016; Tucci, 2016). 
In other words, it has been applied to the strategy as a reactive conceptual 
compromise to mitigate the fact the EU lacks effective control over the 
societal development and security situation in its “near abroad”. The 
1990s and early 2000s promise of the EU as a progressive and pacifying 
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liberal project that would also allow good governance practices to trickle 
into the societies in its near abroad has not yet materialised. Instead, hot 
crises, interlinked extra- and intrastate wars as well as the fundamental 
lack of human security in the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe 
painfully testify to the crisis of the EU as a liberal project, not to mention 
the EU’s internal challenges and disintegrating propensities. In this light, 
resilience has been invented as a boundary concept or communication 
device uniting those who still believe in the optimistic liberal project and 
its soft power effects with those who favour a more isolationist approach 
and emphasise the role of power politics and strict control of the EU’s 
external borders (Cross, 2016).
The EU seems to be more sceptical of its own leadership abilities and 
readiness to govern the complex threat environment with top-down models 
now than it was two decades ago. Following the security mentality based 
on resilience and the dispersion of security agency as the nodal theory 
of security governance presented above suggests the EU’s approach to 
reinforce the strengths and resources of local agents, communities, and 
civil society is the starting point of a decentralised and agile mode of 
security governance.
On the other hand, it is good to acknowledge that societal security 
strategies and internal security strategies usually have citizen participation 
and deliberation as their strategic objectives. They are considered integral 
elements of systemic comprehensive security, where collaborative, complex, 
adaptive networks are seen as new forums of citizen engagement. To give 
a recent example from Finland, deliberative models have been introduced 
into the areas of societal security and resilience. Citizen engagement and 
participation has been enhanced through novel practices such as citizen 
sourcing and citizen juries (Virta & Branders, 2016, p. 1151).
Discussion
In contemporary security parlance, resilience refers to the ability 
of societies, communities and even individuals to withstand major 
disruptions or shocks and to maintain one’s functioning – even learning 
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to be stronger – after adversity. As a strategic concept directing security 
policy, resilience is a sweeping response to perceptions of increasing 
complexity posed by the combination of various nonlinear threats and 
the vulnerability of our postmodern societies and lifestyles. 
The rise of resilience politics does not come without possible ethical 
problems. Some scholars have even claimed the rise of resilience as a 
dominant security mentality might lead towards a culture of insecurity 
where policies are guided with the goal of taming the most harmful 
consequences of insecurity instead of comprehensively providing safety 
from harm (see Evans & Reid, 2014; Joseph, 2013; Methmann & Oels, 2015). 
Using the nodal theory of security governance, we have also illustrated 
the possible implications that the shift from security mentalities such 
as protection, prevention, and defence to that of resilience poses to the 
techniques of security governance, agency, and leadership in general. 
The rise of resilience politics seems to follow the general lines of nodal 
theory in that the security political actorness continues to disperse among 
different levels of societal actors. At the same time, the increasing demands 
of security indicate traditional state-centric security actors are facing 
severe challenges in terms of security leadership. 
The rise of resilience politics and its practical implications indicate a 
certain lack of leadership and controllability. On the face of it, traditional 
security authority tends towards multilayered nodes and actors, all 
the way to communities and individuals. This might lead to positive 
enhancement of several societal actors in terms of security actorness. 
But the increasing reliance on resilience also has a dark side. What seems 
especially daunting is the critique that resilience strategies naturalise 
complexity-induced insecurity as a permanent state and normalise crises 
as potentially positive learning experiences enabling one to become 
stronger and more anti-fragile (see Schmidt, 2015). In some instances, 
the increasing demand for resilience might decrease incentives for 
traditional state actors to transform social structures with reforms 
and preventive policies. It is also appropriate to ask whether resilience 
approaches rely on a relatively managerial and reactive conception of 
political subjectivity activated only after the harm has already occurred. 
As a security mentality, resilience seems to be rather passive in the face 
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of complex threats stemming from outside and within one’s society 
(Bourbeau, 2015, pp. 174–177; Juntunen & Hyvönen, 2014).
Finally, in terms of security leadership and management in practice, 
within the complex contemporary world of old, new, and emerging 
threats and risks, the terms “security risk management” and “security risk 
governance” best describe the strategic and operative functions of various 
networked actors and nodes in doing and delivering security – global 
networks, states, authorities, civil society assemblages, and people 
themselves (see Button, 2008). A systemic approach to security entails 
complex and adaptive security systems and subsystems. The value of 
the complexity theory derives from its characteristics: interdisciplinary, 
nondeterministic, systemic, contextual or circumstantial, and chaotic; 
or at least not entirely predictable and developmental (Pycroft & 
Bartollas, 2014). Security leadership requires systems intelligence. This 
means understanding the interconnectedness and interdependency of 
various phenomena, understanding what complexity is and means, and 
understanding the contingent, ambiguous, and political nature of security 
– or rather, securities (Virta & Branders, 2016).
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